We introduce a simple equilibrium model of a market for loans. Households lend to firms and form expectations about their loan default probability. Under heterogeneous expectations, with switching between forecasting strategies driven by reinforcement learning, even a small fraction of pessimistic traders has a large aggregate effect, causing a heterogeneous expectations risk premium, i.e. significantly higher contract rates for loans and significantly lower output. Our stylized model illustrates how animal spirits and heterogeneous expectations may lead to a confidence loss and to financial instability amplifying the magnitude of economic crises and slowing down recovery.
In order to model the Akerlof-Shiller "animal spirits" and "confidence", we apply the Brock-Hommes heterogeneous expectations framework to a dynamic equilibrium model of loanable funds. We abstract from the complexity of the real world contract terms for a loan by using a one-dimensional proxy variable that we call the "contract rate". The reader should think of a contract rate not only as a measure of the interest rate for the loan, but more generally of "qualification adjusted contract terms" describing today's 1 Simsek (2011) and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) have stressed the role of overly optimistic (over confident) believers in driving bubble like phenomena in a framework where rational agents take into account the presence of overly optimistic believers. In our model most agents are boundedly rational, without perfect knowledge about the beliefs of other agents; see Hommes (2006) for an overview and extensive discussion of heterogeneous expectations and bounded rationality.
4 difficulties of getting a loan. A higher contract rate then does not necessarily mean a higher interest rate for the loan, but represents increasing general qualifications to obtain a loan, e.g. raising credit score qualifications, increasing down payment requirements for the loan, etc.
We borrow from recent work by Manski (2008, 2011) , (B&M hereafter) to describe and conceptualize ambiguity and pessimism in a credit market economy. In particular B&M take into account the existence in credit markets of an informational problem due to partial knowledge of loan repayments, i.e. lenders do not know a priori whether a borrower will totally repay his debt or only part of it, or, in the worst case scenario, he will not repay at all. In B&M lenders must build a model of borrower behavior, which they are unable to completely specify due to lack of knowledge. We assume that most lenders lack fully rational expectations in forming expectations about the future share of loans that will be paid back. While B&M use a static model, we study the role of expectations in a dynamic equilibrium model for loanable funds driven by an exogenous stochastic process for the probability that loans will be paid back. We deviate from rational expectations by considering a model with heterogeneous, boundedly rational expectations. In particular, we replace rational expectations with other heterogeneous types of expectational schemes, including rational, naive, average, trend following and pessimistic expectations. As in Hommes (1997,1998) , agents select among forecasting rules, depending upon the relative success of each rule in predicting the loan default probability.
The presence of non-rational expectations and heterogeneity will play an important role when the credit market experiences an unexpected negative shock. The main result of our paper is that heterogeneity in expectations and the presence of pessimistic agents, even when their fraction is relatively small, has a significant and persistent aggregate effect. Indeed, even a small fraction of pessimistic traders causes a heterogeneous expectations risk premium, i.e. significantly higher contract rates in the loan market and significantly lower wages and output. Heterogeneity in expectations affects both the magnitude of a crisis and the speed of recovery from a crisis. More precisely, heterogeneity in expectations has a significant effect upon the increase of the contract rates for 5 loans, a subsequent decline of lending, wages and output and slows down the recovery from an economic crisis.
The present paper is closely linked to the "confidence" "Animal Spirits" of Akerlof and Shiller (2009), because we introduce a measure of confidence, represented by the lender's expectation about the borrower's probability of success, i.e. the probability to repay the loan. In fact, we can interpret the probability of success as a measure of optimism about the share of borrowers that will be solvent. In other words the higher the expectation of the probability of success the higher the lender's confidence that tomorrow the borrower will reimburse the loan (and vice versa). We view our paper as moving a step ahead introducing the endogenous role of heterogeneous expectations in building an explicit stylized dynamic model of (part of) Akerlof and Shiller's conceptual framework of animal spirits and confidence to model economic crises. This enables us to study the way in which heterogeneity affects the path towards recovery after a negative shock to the economy. In particular we find that a snap collapse of confidence, due to an unanticipated negative shock, in the presence of heterogeneous agents, may amplify a downturn and may keep the economy in a recession phase for a longer period than in the case of a representative rational agent. To put it in another way we show how different individual expectational schemes on "confidence" impact the aggregate dynamics of output and contract terms in our model. While we emphasize the problems caused by excessively pessimistic beliefs and/or the presence of ambiguity and the aversion caused by it, we could just as easily use our model to study the opposite case of problems caused by excessively optimistic beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the modeling framework describing households and firms, while Section 3 presents the dynamic equilibrium. In Section 4 we consider a number of homogeneous expectations benchmarks, including naive, rational, average, trend following and pessimistic (minimum) expectations. Section 5 focuses on heterogeneous expectations and presents a number of simple 2-type examples as well as a 6-type example collecting all previous homogeneous rules. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
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This section describes the basic ingredients of our framework. We consider a market for loanable funds that is populated by households/lenders and firms/borrowers. The households' sector, which also represents the supply side of the market for loanable funds, is built by means of an overlapping generations framework in which each agent when young consumes (c t,t ) and saves earnings (s t ) from work, with wages w p,t and an endowment (ω y ). Savings are invested either in a safe asset or in a risky asset (productive investment). When old the agent consumes (c t,t+1 ) an endowment (ω o ) and the average return on investments.
The demand side of the market for loanable funds in our economy is represented by firms that borrow a certain amount of capital (x t ) for production and remunerate work after paying back their debt. The remuneration for work is used by households to consume and to save. Savings are used to extend loans to the firms' sector.
Households
The supply side of our economy is described by means of a two-period overlapping generations structure. We assume that the young agent at date t has preferences defined over consumption when young c t,t and when old c t,t+1 . For the sake of convenience, we assume a logarithmic utility function. The objective function therefore is
where c e t,t+1 is expected consumption when old. When young, the agent works and earns a real wage w p,t (i.e. wages from the productive sector), and receives an (exogenous) endowment ω y . He invests his savings s t partly in a safe asset, which yields a known fixed return ρ at t + 1, and partly in a risky asset whose rate of return λ t+1 in period t + 1 is uncertain. Investment in the risky asset can be conceived of as employment of resources ("capital") in the productive sector, whose output is uncertain. The expectations by the young formed at date t on the return of the risky asset at date t + 1 are denoted by λ e t+1 . When old, the agent retires and receives an (exogenous) endowment ω o (at the 7 beginning of old age) and the return on asset investments. The budget constraint of the agent when young and when old respectively, therefore, are The FOC gives the following expression for savings
.
(2.6)
Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, zero endowment when old i.e., ω o = 0, the FOC simplifies to
Note that (2.7) says that, conditional on w t , the demand for investment is perfectly inelastic w.r.t. known and unknown returns on assets next period.
Firms' demand for loanable funds
Following Manski (2008, 2011) we assume that borrowers get into debt in order to finance productive investments. Moreover, if returns on investments turn out to be too low, they may not be able to pay back. Therefore, we introduce a (time varying) probability of success, p t and a probability of bankruptcy 1 − p t . The probability of success represents the share of firms that will be able to pay back their loans. Given the assumptions above firms choose the amount of capital x t , borrowed from the lending side of the economy, at time t solving the maximization problem:
where r t > 1 is the gross "contract rate" (i.e. the "rental rate" on capital) and g(x t ) is the production function, assumed to be strictly concave with decreasing returns to scale 2 .
Here "contract rate" is a "proxy" for the general contract terms describing difficulties of getting a loan. A higher contract rate does not necessarily mean a higher interest rate for the loan, but also reflects an increase of the general qualifications to obtain a loan, such as raising credit score qualifications, increasing down payment requirements, etc.
The maximization problem yields the following FOC:
Given the features of the production function g(x t ), (2.9) represents a decreasing relation between the amount of capital at period t and the rental rate on capital in the same period therefore, it defines the demand for capital in this setting. We can define the returns to the "other factor" (i.e. labor) besides factor x as a function of the amount of factor x hired. In other words what is left over after overheads and capital are paid goes to other factors and the bulk of other factors are types of labor. Hence wages from the productive sector at time t, w p,t , in our economy can be defined as:
Substituting eq. (2.9) we get
In the case of a Cobb Douglas production function g(x t ) = x α t , where 0 < α < 1 represents the capital's share, (2.9) and (2.10) specialize to the demand function and wages given by
12)
Substituting the demand for capital x t from (2.12) into (2.13) we get the labor income in the case of Cobb Douglas production function 14) where η = α α 1−α (1−α). Since lenders get zero under bankruptcy and consequently wages for bankrupt firms are zero it follows that (2.14) represents wages paid by successful firms at time t. For later use it will also be useful to define the inverse demand function as
Equilibrium
In this section we will compute the equilibrium of our economy. Following Manski (2008, 2011) , we indicate with x j (r t ) the j-th borrower's loan demand at a contract rate r t . Hence for a "sample" of J firms the lender's expected loan return is
where ı(j ∈ S t ) is the indicator function which is unity if firm j is successful at date t and is zero otherwise. Moreover the numerator represents aggregate repayment and the denominator aggregate loan demand. We assume success is independently distributed across firms at each date t. Therefore, firm j chooses x j,t to satisfy:
provided that the maximized quantity is nonnegative, otherwise firm j shuts down and does not operate in period t, that is, it chooses x j,t = 0.
Assume that the probability of success is the same for all firms at date t, i.e. p j,t ≡ p t , for all j. Then each firm solves the same maximization problem and the optimal solution is the same for all firms. Apply the Law of Large Numbers to Eq. (3.1) to obtain the "population" loan return function:
is the expected probability of success, that is, the share of firms that is expected to be able to pay back the loan. The expected probability of success may be seen as a measure of "confidence" in our economy. Assuming risk neutrality, the no arbitrage condition is such that the return on the risky asset equals the return on the risk free investment i.e., λ t = ρ. It follows that the no arbitrage value of the contract rate (r * t ) is
given by the following relation
(3.4)
At this stage we have all the necessary ingredients to compute the equilibrium of our 11 model. Let us define
where the upper bar over the indicator function means that it is the set [0, 1] when = holds instead of >. Hence we can define the loan supply correspondence, when old age endowment ω o is zero, by
], (3.6) that is, when r t > r * t (r t < r * t ) all savings are invested into loans (the risk free asset).
Note that it is the belief p e t+1 formed at date t about the probability of success in t + 1 that determines the loan supply at time t.
The demand for capital and the equilibrium value for the contract rate (r t ) are determined by market clearing, i.e.
Since the supply correspondence is a (time varying) step function, there are two possibilities for the equilibrium, points A and B, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The first possibility for equilibrium (point A) is given by
arising when x(r * A ; p t ) < w t /2, where x(·) is the demand function (2.12).
The other possibility (point B) is given by
(3.10)
and it arises when x(r * A ; p t ) > w t /2. The loan supply correspondence (3.6) and the demand curve (2.9). Points A and B represents the two possible configurations of the temporary equilibrium allocations (x * , r * ) depending on the time varying features of the demand and supply curves.
It is important to note the crucial role played by expectations on the firms' probability of success (p e t+1 ), the confidence measure in our economy. In fact, given the return on the risk free asset, the higher the expected probability of success the lower will be the non arbitrage contract rate (r * t ) and, consequently, the higher will the the demand for capital (x * t ). On the other hand, a low expected probability of success p e t+1 causes the contract equilibrium rate r * A to rise sharply.
Homogeneous beliefs
So far we have not specified the probability of success p t and how lenders form expectations about this probability to repay the loan. We are particularly interested in the situation where there is a "bad" exogenous shock to the economy and the probability of success suddenly drops. Instead of focussing on a single stochastic negative shock and an impulse response analysis, we assume a dynamic stochastic process for the probability of success and then study the corresponding equilibrium dynamics. We focus on the simple 13 case of an AR(1) process for the probability of success, given by
where µ is the long run average, a is the first order autocorrelation coefficient and t is an IID random variable drawn from a normal distribution. Throughout the paper we fix µ = 0.95, a = 0.8 and σ = 0.01, so that the (long run) average is 0.95 and there is some persistence in the probability of success. In all dynamic simulations in this paper, the realized random probability time series is as illustrated in Figure 2 (top panels).
The success probability fluctuates between 0.899 and 0.969 over 100 periods. Between periods 20 and 30, the probability gradually declines to hit its lowest value 0.899 in period 31. We will refer to this lowest value as the "crisis" due to the exogenous shocks.
Our main interest here is how confidence, that is, expectations about the probability of success, affects temporary equilibrium dynamics of contract rates, wages and output, and in particular, what happens after the exogenously generated crisis.
Before investigating the role of heterogeneous expectations, by way of comparison it is useful to consider a number of benchmark specifications of the lender's expectations in the simple case of a representative agent, i.e. we will consider some homogeneous expectations benchmarks. In addition to the standard rational expectations view, we allow for bounded rationality and consider a number of benchmark cases with a simple forecasting rule. Hey (1994) showed that in laboratory experiments where individuals forecast an exogenous stochastic AR1 time series, rational expectations is rejected in most cases and simple forecasting rules such as adaptive expectations provide a better description of individual forecasting behavior; see also Dwyer et al. (1993) . In more recent learning to forecast laboratory experiments simple forecasting rules, such as naive expectations or a trend following rule, as described below, fit individual forecasting behavior quite nicely, see e.g. the survey in Hommes (2011).
Naive expectations
To get some intuition for the equilibrium dynamics, we start off with the simple case of naive expectations, where the forecast of the probability of success at period t + 1 is given by last period's observation, i.e.,
Figure 2a illustrates time series of the realized probability p t , the naive forecast and the equilibrium contract rate r t . Clearly the naive forecast lags realized probability by one period and the contract rate spikes in period 32, immediately after the probability of success hits its lowest value in the "crisis-period" 31 (or equivalently the probability of default hits its highest value). The dynamics of the contract rates is characterized by mean reversion to its long run equilibrium valuer = ρ/µ = (1.01/0.95) ≈ 1.063, where ρ is the risk free rate of return and µ is the long run mean of the AR(1) stochastic probability process. Under naive expectations, the dynamics of the contract rate r t is thus completely driven by the exogenous probability of success, just lagging one period behind. The speed of recovery of the economy after the exogenous crisis in period 31 is the same as the speed of mean reversion of the realized probability of success, and lags only one period behind the true probability.
Rational expectations
In the case of rational expectations, lenders are assumed to have perfect knowledge about true stochastic probability process. Agents know that the probability of success follows the AR(1) process (4.1) and have perfect knowledge about its parameters. The rational forecast of the probability of success at period t + 1 is given by
Figure 2b illustrates time series of the realized probability p t , the rational AR(1) forecast, and the equilibrium contract rate r t . The rational forecast closely tracks the realized probability and the contract rate spikes in the crisis period 31 when the probability of success hits its lowest value, or equivalently when the probability of default hits its highest value. The dynamics of the contract rate under rational expectations is in fact similar to the case of naive expectations. The only difference is that there is no time lag and the peaks are somewhat less extreme, because the rational AR(1) rule correctly predicts mean reversion (on average) after an extreme observation, while naive expectations then uses the minimum (or maximum) observation. Under rational expectations, the dynamics of the contract rates is characterized by mean reversion to its long run equilibrium valuer = ρ/µ, with the same speed as the true probability process and the peak in the contract rate coincides exactly with the (exogenously generated) crisis.
Average beliefs
Another interesting case is when agents use long run averages in forecasting. In the case of average expectations, the forecast of the probability of success is given by the sample average of past observation, i.e., Figure 2c illustrates time series of the realized probability p t , the average forecast and the equilibrium contract rate r t . The average forecast adjusts slowly following realized probability and decreases gradually in the first 30 periods, until the probability of success hits its lowest value, in period 31. As a result, the contract rate slowly increases and slowly converges to its long run equilibrium levelr = ρ/µ ≈ 1.063. Hence, when all agents in the economy give equal weight to all past observations, the economy slowly converges to its long run equilibrium steady state. 
Trend following expectations
In the case of trend following expectations the forecast of the probability of success is given by a simple linear extrapolation rule
Simple trend following rules belong to the most popular rules used in learning to forecast laboratory experiments with human subjects (e.g. Hommes, 2011) and are also popular among chartists' trading rules in financial markets and have been found in survey data (e.g. Frankel and Froot, 1990, Allen and Taylor, 1990) . Figure 2e illustrates time series of the realized probability p t , the trend follower forecast (4.5) and the equilibrium contract rate r t . Trend followers may lead to overly pessimistic or optimistic expectations, when the trend following forecast undershoots its minimum or overshoots its maximum realized value. As a consequence, this leads to more extreme maximum values of the contract rate in periods 32 − 33, immediately following the exogenously generated crisis period 31. Hence, the presence of trend followers may amplify the magnitude of a crisis.
Pessimistic expectations
Finally, consider the homogeneous benchmark case of pessimistic expectations. We model pessimistic expectations by a forecast that predicts that the probability of success remains at its lowest observed value in the last T periods, i.e.,
As a typical example in the simulations below we choose T = 10. Figure 2d illustrates time series of the realized probability p t , the minimum forecast, together with the corresponding equilibrium contract rate r t . The minimum forecast adjust according to the local minima of the observed probability and decreases until its lowest value in period 32 to stay there for 10 periods, after the probability of success hits its lowest value, in period 31. As a result, the contract rate increases gradually and hits its highest value in period 32 to stay there for 10 periods. Under pessimistic beliefs after each local minimum of the probability of success the contract rate spikes at a local maximum and stays there for at least T = 10 periods or jumps to a new (local) maximum. Hence, in a homogeneous world of pessimistic expectations crises are deep and much more persistent than the true probability process.
18
We extend our framework in order to take into account heterogeneity in agents' beliefs. In particular, we will follow Brock and Hommes (1997) 
Heterogeneous expectations
Assume there are J types of lenders in our economy at date t. At date t, type j's forecast for period t + 1 of the return on the risky asset is given by λ e j,t+1 = p Hence, each forecasting rule is determined by its forecast p e j,t+1 of the probability of success, i.e. the probability that the firm will pay back the loan. Agents can choose between J different forecasting rules. The key idea of the switching model is that agents are boundedly rational and choose a forecasting strategy based upon its relative past performance. Let U j,t be a weighted average of past squared forecasting errors of the returns, that is,
where γ is the weight given to past fitness. Let u j,t be the relative past squared forecasting errors of the returns of the risky asset, that is,
3) choice is to differences in heuristics' performance. In the extreme case β = 0, the relative weights of heuristics are not updated; at the other extreme β = +∞, a fraction 1 − δ of agents switch immediately to the best predictor. In the simulations of heterogeneous market equilibrium dynamics below, the parameters will be fixed at β = 5, δ = 0.5 and γ = 0, but the results are fairly robust w.r.t. changes of these parameters.
Under heterogeneous expectations, we define total supply of loans at date t as
Recalling Eq. (3.3) we have
where p e j,t+1 represents expectations of type j about the probability of success and n j,t represents the fraction of agents of type j at time t. to n 1t w t /2, and at r * 2 = ρ/p e 2,t+1 , where the loan supply switches from n 1t w t /2 to w t /2.
Two type examples
To get some intuition for the equilibrium dynamics under heterogeneous expectations, in this section we consider three simple 2-types examples. In the first, average expectations competes against pessimistic (minimum) expectations. In the second example rational expectations, using the correct AR1 forecasting rule for the probability process, competes against pessimistic (minimum) expectations. In the third example trend follower expectations competes against pessimistic (minimum) expectations. In all three 2-type examples, for the exogenous AR1 stochastic time series of the probability of success, we use the same realizations as for the homogeneous benchmarks before, with its minimum realization in the "crisis-period" 31. , where the loan supply switches from 0 to n 1t w t /2, and at r * = ρ/p e 2,t+1 , where the loan supply switches from n 1t w t /2 to w t /2. restored and for a relatively long period contract rates remain high and output remains low. Figure 5 illustrates the case of rational expectations versus pessimistic beliefs. Rational agents know the true exogenous probability generating process (4.1) and therefore use the optimal, model consistent AR1 forecasting rule to predict the firms' probability of success. Notice that AR1 forecasters are not only rational forecasters, but also rational optimizers maximizing utility (2.1) under the budget constraint (2.2-2.3), given their forecast of the expected loan return λ non-rational agents, who affect this equilibrium contract rate r t , into account 4 . Figure 5 shows that the contract rate switches between persistent phases of high contract rates, when pessimistic expectations dominate, and phases of low contract rates (around 5%), when rational expectations dominate. The fraction of pessimistic and rational traders vary considerably over time (top right panel).
Average versus pessimistic beliefs

Rational versus pessimistic beliefs
Persistent phases of high contract rate occur when the majority of agents switches to pessimistic expectations. In the previous 2-type example average versus pessimistic beliefs we have seen that if the probability of success recovers, average expectations drive down the contract rate somewhat but only to average values. Rational expectations more accurately track the true probability process and lead to normal or even low contract rates when the true probability recovers and attains above average values. However, this simple 2-type example also illustrates that in a heterogeneous 2-type world rational agents can not drive out pessimistic expectations and as a consequence in such a simple heterogeneous world crises i.e., periods of exceptionally high contract rates, are deeper and more persistent. Figure 6 illustrates the 2-type case of trend follower versus pessimistic (minimum) beliefs. The contract rate switches between persistent phases of high contract rates, when pessimistic expectations dominate, and phases of lower contract rates (around 6% or lower), when trend follower expectations dominate. Trend followers expectations overestimate (or underestimate) the probability of success during good (or bad) times, as the trend extrapolation rule may yield forecasts outside the range of realized values of the probability. As a consequence the presence of trend followers makes the behavior of the contract rate somewhat more extreme with even higher peaks, e.g. in periods 32 − 34, after the crisis in period 31.
Trend followers versus pessimistic beliefs
A stylized example with six belief types
In this section we present a heterogeneous expectations example with six different forecasting rules. In addition to the five rules discussed before, naive, rational, average, trend following and pessimistic (minimum) expectations, we introduce another slightly more pessimistic "worst case" expectations rule predicting that the probability of success is given by the minimum of its realization in the last T periods and all other forecasts in the previous period, i.e., forecasts of other agents. We stress once more that our analysis focusses on problems caused by excessively pessimistic expectations, to study recovery from a crisis after a drop of confidence in the economy, but our model heterogeneous expectations switching model could be easily applied e.g. to study the role of excessively optimistic expectations in amplifying booms 5 . fluctuating (between 0 and 0.3 and pessimistic and worst case expectations being the minority types, but never completely driven out of the market.
The contract rate (bottom left panel) gradually increases hitting its peak around periods 30 − 33 and remaining persistently high between periods 34 − 42. Overall, the contract rate is persistently higher than the long run equilibrium rater = ρ/µ = 1.063, due to the presence of pessimistic forecasters, even when their fractions are relatively small. It is important to note that around the exogenously generated crisis of period 31, the fractions of pessimistic and worst case expectations are at a peak, both around 0.2, adding up to about 0.4, and only decrease gradually thereafter. A relatively small fraction of pessimistic traders thus has a significant impact on aggregate outcomes and contributes to a high equilibrium contract rates for more than 10 periods. The time series of output g(x) is also shown (bottom right panel), with a minimum value at the exogenously generated crisis in period 31 and only slowly recovering in subsequent periods. illustrates that the difference of the contract rates under boundedly rational heterogeneous expectations and homogeneous rational expectations is significantly positive over the entire sample and highly persistent. We refer to this difference r HET − r RE as the heterogeneous expectations risk premium of the contract rate for loans. The average heterogeneous expectations risk premium isr HET −r RE ≈ 2.4%. Notice that its peak is about 6.8%, and occurs in period 39, that is, much later than the worst exogenous shock in the crisis period 31, at times when the rational forecast has already correctly predicted the mean reversion of the probability of success towards its mean, while under heterogeneous expectations the influence of a relatively small fraction of pessimistic agents on aggregate behaviour is still highly significant.
Similarly, the bottom panel of Figure 8 illustrates differences in output under heterogeneous versus homogeneous rational expectations. Under heterogeneous expectations, output is significantly lower than under rational expectations. On average, the output loss (y RE − y Het )/y RE due to heterogeneous expectations is about 1.1%, with a peak of more than 3%. As for the peak in the differences in the contract rate, the biggest output loss due to heterogeneous expectations occurs in period 39, much later than the crisis period 31, and it occurs when in fact the exogenous probability of success already has recovered to normal levels, but a drop of confidence due to boundedly rational heterogeneous expectations still affects output at the macro level significantly, even when the fractions of pessimists and worst case believers at the micro level are relatively small.
Why then are the fully rational agents, using the AR1 model consistent forecasting rule of the exogenous probability of success, not driving out all other forecasting rules, as has been suggested by the traditional rational approach, advocated e.g. by Friedman (1953) and Fama (1970) 6 ? It is useful to discuss once more the main driving forces behind the simulation results of our heterogeneous expectations selection framework (5.2-5.4), which is based on Brock and Hommes (1997). There are four key elements of why non-rational forecasting rules survive in our economy with performance based strategy selection.
1. Agents choose between heterogeneous forecasting rules based upon recent forecasting performance. Their choice is boundedly rational in the sense that their intensity of choice to switch strategies is finite, i.e. β < ∞, implying that some agents will not switch to the best strategy. For β < ∞, each rule attracts some followers. When β ≈ 0, the distribution of the population over the forecasting rules is flat, with fractions approximately equal. For β ≈ ∞ the distribution over rules is peaked, with most agents choosing the best strategy.
2. The performance measure is a weighted average of past (relative) forecasting errors, as in (5.2). In the special case when the contract rate r t would be constant and memory would be infinite (i.e. γ = 1), the performance measure is, up to a scaling factor, equivalent to the MSE. Therefore, in the special case of constant contract rate, infinite memory γ = 1 and infinite intensity of choice β = +∞, in the long run the rational AR1 forecast would drive out all other forecasting rules. Hence, the rational benchmark is nested within our framework as a special case. In the more realistic case when memory is finite, i.e. 0 ≤ γ < 1, and when agents are boundedly rational, i.e. β < ∞, some fraction of agents will choose alternative forecasting rules. There is empirical evidence that recent performance is important for strategy selection. For example, evidence from empirical finance suggests that the flow in and out of mutual funds is strongly driven by the recent past performance of these funds (e.g. Sirri and Tufano, 1998, Karceski, 2002) . past, even when such performance was driven by an exogenous random sequence and individuals had enough information about which strategy was optimal on average.
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3. In the performance measure (5.2), the contract rate r t is time varying, and equals the weight given to the most recent forecasting error of the probability of success.
Hence, in times when the contract rate is high, more weight is given to recent forecasting errors. High contract rates arise in "bad times", when the exogenous probability of success is low. Exactly in these "bad times", the pessimistic forecasting rules perform relatively well and therefore attract more followers among the boundedly rational agents. Hence, especially in "bad times" pessimistic expectations will kick in more easily, in a boundedly rational heterogeneous world. These four plausible and empirically relevant elements of strategy switching cause non-rational rules to survive in the population. In particular, they cause (at least) a small fraction of agents to have pessimistic expectations. But even a relatively small fraction of pessimistic believers has a significant effect upon aggregate behaviour and causes crises to be deeper and more persistent.
Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to build a model of "animal spirits" and "confidence", as of boundedly rational agents, thus destabilizing the market. Policy implications concerning regulating financial innovation may thus be completely opposite whether one adopts a homogeneous rational or a boundedly rational heterogeneous expectations market view.
